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[Abstract] We study the causal relationship between police corruption, crime and 
crime reporting, using data from the International Crime Victimization Survey. Us-
ing a simultaneous equations approach we ﬁnd a number of intuitive relationships, 
which are statistically signiﬁcant.  The clearest of these is that crime reporting 
reduces police corruption.  

1. Introduction 
One of the central roles of government is the protection of the person and the property of its citi-
zens. In addition to the large direct effect on welfare when citizens fear being victimized, there is 
also an impact on income if crime has a negative impact on social order, stability and commerce. 
Researchers have explained the variation of crime rates across countries by social, cultural, and 
economic factors. In this paper we aim to contribute to this line of research by investigating the 
causal links between police corruption, crime and crime reporting.  
We find that crime rates, crime reporting, and police corruption jointly determine each 
other. There are several interactions: Crime reporting declines with police corruption and crime 
rates. The clearest of these is that police corruption decreases with crime reporting. 
Most theoretical models of crime in the economics literature start from Becker’s “crime 
and punishment” model (Becker, 1968; and Becker and Stigler, 1974). That model focuses on a 
typical individual who compares the expected utility of legal and illegal behavior. Crime is posi-
tively related to the potential gains from illegal activity and negatively related to the probability 
of conviction and the size of punishment.  
From this starting point the theoretical and empirical literature on economics of crime has 
provided a number of different results, some contradictory. The most prominently discussed rea-
sons of criminal behavior are income and income inequality (Entorf and Spengler, 1998; Fowles 
and Merva, 1996; Kelly, 2000; Chiu and Madden, 1998; Fanjzylber et al, 2000).  Urbanization 
(Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1996), education and institutional development, such as the quantity of 
the police force and the judiciary have also been emphasized by some authors (Usher, 1997; Fan-
jzylber et al, 2000; Buonanno and MonTolio, 2006). Bourguignon (1999) fits the Becker model 
into a simple distributional framework. He models the crime rate so it will increase with the 
gains from crime and the extent of poverty and decreases with such crime-deterrent variables as 
the probability of detection, the size of the penalty and the extent of honesty within society.  
Many studies argue that urban areas are more likely to have higher crime rates than rural 
areas and large cities more than small ones, perhaps due to higher pecuniary returns to crime in 
urban areas and the effect of population density on the probability of apprehension. Cities may 
create greater returns to crime because criminals may have greater access to the wealthy and face 
a greater density of victims. Also urban density makes it harder for the police to track criminals, 
which leads to lower probabilities of recognition and a lower probability of arrest.  Van Kesteren 
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et al (2001) have analyzed individual risk factors of victimization in 17 industrialized countries 
using data from the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) in 2000. They have found that 
town size, income, juvenility, risky life-styles, and weak guardianship are significant risk factors 
but gender and educational level are not. 
A major reason for the lack of conclusive results is the different ways crime data are gen-
erated. That is why we here pay much attention to the role of crime reporting. The link between 
development level (measured by poverty rate or income level) and crime rates appears inconclu-
sive. Empirical studies within one particular country (such as the United States: Fowles and 
Merva, 1996; Kelly, 2000) suggest a negative effect of income on crime rates. Cross-country 
studies, on the other hand, report the opposite result. The usual conclusion in cross-national stud-
ies is that higher income inequality leads to a higher crime level (e.g. Fanjzylber et al, 2000). 
Some researchers, who use official crime data, even report that higher income increases the 
crime rates. Soares (2004a) shows that this is likely to be due to biases in official crime data, 
which tend to underreport crimes in poorer countries.  
The link between crime rates and macro governance has been addressed recently (Leder-
man, et al. 2004). If, for example, aggregate corruption – where we have empirical indicators – is 
correlated with corruption levels in the police – we have a reasonable microeconomic mecha-
nism where corruption may impact crime. Hunt (2006a) shows that corruption is disproportion-
ately prevalent in the police and law enforcement sectors.  Corruption in police may obviously 
hurt the effectiveness of law enforcement. If so, higher crime rates may result through a Becker 
mechanism. For example, criminals may bribe the police to avoid punishment, or corruption in 
hiring or budgeting process within law enforcement agencies may undermine the quality and ef-
fectiveness of the police force. Azfar (2004) has already shown that there is a strong correlation 
between homicide rates and the general level of corruption. This relationship remains strong and 
significant after controlling for income, inequality, presence of the death penalty, schooling and 
ethnic fractionalization. While that analysis was done without data specifically on police corrup-
tion, it seems that the most likely reason for a link between the general level of corruption and 
homicides is that police corruption increases homicides.  
The empirical problems created by underreporting of crime in less developed countries, 
emphasized and corrected by Soares (2004a) apply as strongly to biasing the estimated relation-
ship between governance and crime.  The main reason is that police data have proved widely 
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misleading and crime is under-reported in countries with lower income and poorer governance. 
As explained in Soares (2004a) official crime statistics may underestimate actual crime rates, due 
to underreporting bias of police officers and/or unwillingness of crime victims to report crimes. 
Surveys, such as the International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS), may provide more reliable re-
sults than the police-reported data. Andvig and Shrivasta (2008) document problems with the 
ICVS itself, and the results of Azfar and Murrell (2009) suggest we should treat survey data on 
sensitive subjects with some caution.  However these problems pale in comparison to the prob-
lems of police reported data, which systematically underreports crime in the most corrupt and 
under-developed countries. Hence we use ICVS data for our econometric analysis, both in this 
paper and for our previous work described below.  
Azfar and Gurgur (2004) report that governance is strongly linked with both crime inci-
dence and crime reporting rates even after controlling for possible endogeneity of the governance 
variable. Moreover, governance and income inequality do not have the same effect on every 
household: it is conditional on personal, social and economic characteristics. Urban, female, or 
poor citizens are more likely to experience a crime and less likely to report it if they live in coun-
tries with high-income inequality and poor governance.  
Here we seek to understand the relationships between police corruption, crime and crime 
reporting.  Since crime rates, crime reporting, and police corruption are likely to be affected by 
each other (for some mechanisms see Hunt 2006b), it is crucial to come up with some instru-
ments that isolate this interaction. We  provide some novel instruments to address the reverse 
causality problem, combining data from the International Crime Victim Survey, the World Val-
ues Survey (WVS) and other sources. 
In Section 2 we present our hypotheses about to the nexus of crime-crime reporting-
police corruption. In Section 3 we describe our variables of interest in more detail. In Section 4 
we provide some preliminary analysis. The estimation results are presented and discussed in Sec-
tion 5. In Section 6 we discuss the kinds of case study evidence needed to address the reverse 
causality questions. Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
7
2. The Model 
The variables we are mainly interested in explaining are crime rates, crime reporting, and police 
corruption. We test several hypotheses related to interactions between them: 
 
H1: Police corruption is likely to lead to higher crime rates: plausible mechanisms are 
criminals being able to buy their way out of punishment; the fraying of meritocracy in the 
police which may reduce the probability of apprehension; the police may even become 
involved with criminal gangs and commit crimes themselves. 
H2: Crime increases police corruption because the general level of criminality may infect 
the police force For example, an increased share of criminals among the public increases 
the share of  population who may have incentives to, and fewer scruples about  bribing  
the police.  Also victims could be doubly victimized by the police (Hunt) 
H3: Reporting crimes should reduce police corruption, since it becomes more difficult for 
corrupt police officials to cooperate with criminals to leave them off the hook when 
crimes are reported. Moreover police corruption itself is a crime that is more likely to get 
punished if they are reported. The Becker mechanism follows. 
H4: Police corruption weakens the trust in law enforcement agencies and therefore dis-
courages crime reporting.  
H5: Crime reporting is likely to reduce crimes since criminals, thinking they are more 
likely to be caught, would be deterred from committing crimes.  
H6: Crime may reduce crime reporting because the public may become demoralized 
about the likelihood that reporting would lead to redress or recovery of property. Also, 
the police may discourage the reporting of minor crimes if they have to deal with lots of 
more serious crimes.  
 
Combining these hypotheses we may construct a system of equations: 
 
1
2
3
Crime (Police Corruption, Crime Reporting, , )
Crime Reporting (Police Corruption, Crime, , )
Police Corruption= (Crime, Crime Reporting, , )
f X Z
g X
h X
=
= Z
Z
 (1) 
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Each equation in (1) involves a set of exogenous variables X that are common to all equa-
tions, as well as a set of exogenous variables Z that are specific to that equation. The Z variables 
are all instruments that help us to identify the system parameters. 
We begin with the common exogenous variables X. These are Income Inequality, Educa-
tion, Urbanization, and Ethnic Differences. They are usually considered as potential determinants 
of crime rates (see Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1996; Chiu and Madden, 1998; Fanjzylber et al, 2000; 
Soares, 2004a). Common results are that crime rates increase with income inequality, urbaniza-
tion, and ethnic differences, and decrease with education. Crime reporting, on the other hand, is 
found to be positively correlated with education, and negatively correlated with income inequal-
ity (Soares, 2004b). We expect urbanization to have a positive influence on crime reporting, 
since crime victims would have easier access to law enforcement agencies. Ethnic differences 
may reduce reporting rates if it nourishes distrust and discrimination within the society, but 
might also increase crime reporting if ethnic groups are inclined to report each other. Finally, 
police corruption is likely to decrease with education, and increase with income inequality and 
ethnic differences (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 1997; Fisman and Gatti, 1999; Treisman, 2000).  
We measure income inequality by the Gini coefficient. For education we use the literacy 
rate. Although the number of years in schooling is also an alternative, we will use the former 
since it covers more countries. For ethnic differences we apply the ethno-linguistic fractionaliza-
tion index used by Easterly and Levine (1997). The fractionalization index measures the prob-
ability that two randomly selected persons from a given country will not belong to the same eth-
nolinguistic group. The higher the index, the more heterogeneous and fragmented society tends 
to be and the lower the probability that economic agents are treated equally and fairly. 
As noted, because each of the endogenous variables is likely to affect the others, it is im-
perative to address the endogeneity of police corruption, crime incidence, and crime reporting 
variables in equations where they are used as regressors. To find appropriate instruments for 
these variables has proved to be a challenging task. A variable has to satisfy three conditions to 
be a good instrument: It has to be exogenous; it has to be correlated with the endogenous vari-
able; and finally it has to influence the dependent variable not directly but only through the en-
dogenous variable it is the instrument for.  
In each equation we use equation-specific exogenous variables that serve as instruments 
to identify the model parameters:  
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Z1 (Crime) = Severity of punishment, Young population, Legality of abortion, Trust, Attitudes to theft 
Z2 (Crime reporting) = Social activism, Membership in voluntary organizations 
Z3 (Police Corruption) = Parking tickets of diplomats, Attitudes towards bribery. 
 
Instruments for Crime 
We use four instruments for crime incidence: variables that we assume have a direct impact on 
the probability of committing a crime, but only indirect effects on the other two endogenous 
variables (via the crime rate). The workings of the instrument ‘severity of punishment’ are  
straightforward. According to Becker’s “crime and punishment” model (Becker 1968, and 
Becker and Stigler 1974), an individual compares the expected utilities of legal and illegal be-
havior. The severity of punishment increases the cost of illegal behavior and reduces the crime 
rate. We indicate the severity of punishment by whether there is death penalty in the legal system 
or not. This is clearly an imperfect measure, but it is the only widely available and objective cri-
terion we are aware of.  
It is a well-known stylized fact that young people are more likely to commit crimes (Pat-
terson, 1991; Fowles and Merva, 1996; Grogger, 1998). Therefore, we expect to see a positive 
link between crime rates and the ratio of young people in the population.  
In recent years, the legalization of abortion in the United States in 1973 has been sug-
gested as one of the reasons that explain the drop in crime rates in late 80s and 90s (Donahue and 
Levitt, 2001). Donahue and Levitt argue that people tend to have unwanted children if abortion is 
illegal. Since these children grow up in an unhealthy environment, they are more likely to engage 
in criminal activities.  
In addition to the aforementioned instruments, we use the “Trust” variable from the 
World Values Survey to measure the level of trust within the society. This measure of trust may 
proxy trustworthiness (Uslaner 2002) and trustworthiness is expected to reduce crime rates. (See 
Azfar and Subrick 2005 for an explanation of this variable and others from the World Values 
Survey).  
We also use another variable that shows attitudes towards crime: the willingness to buy 
stolen goods.  In societies where people have a strong anathema to crime, they may be unwilling 
to buy stolen goods on principle, even if there was no risk of being caught.  We use a question 
from the World Values Survey which asks “Is it ever OK to buy a stolen good?” This unwilling-
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ness may also reduce the pecuniary returns to crime (its less worthwhile stealing a bicycle or 
leather jacket if it will be difficult to resell). Indeed we find that crime levels are a lot lower in 
societies where people are unwilling to buy stolen goods.   
There doesn’t appear to be more than the usual amount of concern about the four instru-
ments used in the crime regression. The instrumental variables are not likely to affect the two 
other dependent variables in a strong way. While there are possible mechanisms for such an in-
fluence (for example, banning abortion may lead to corruption because pregnant women have to 
pay off the police to get one), it seems unlikely that these mechanisms would have a strong 
enough effect to seriously bias the results.  
 
Instruments for Crime Reporting 
Our search for instruments for crime reporting was premised on the idea that crimes are more 
likely to be reported if the citizenry possesses more civic virtue and if crime reporting is less on-
erous. .We use measures of social activism from the World Values Survey as instruments.. 
We use two measures of social activism from the WVS. One is the proportion of house-
holds who are involved in signing a petition to government and the other is the proportion of 
households who are members of voluntary organizations. People who are more active in civic 
activities are also more likely to go to the police to report crimes. These instruments also seem 
broadly plausible.   
 
Instruments for Police Corruption 
Finally, we use two sets of instruments for corruption. Our first instrument is a novel one, first 
introduced by Fisman and Miguel (2006). It measures the number of parking violations commit-
ted by diplomats in New York City. Due to the location of the United Nations Headquarters, 
thousands of diplomats from more than 100 countries live in NYC. Their diplomatic immunity 
shields them from prosecution, including petty crimes like parking tickets (or at least did till the 
Clinton-Schumer Act of 2002). We use the number of tickets per diplomat issued between 1997 
and 2002 as an instrument of corruption. This variable measures law obedience by government 
officials and so might be a good proxy for corruptibility of the police. In many countries like 
Pakistan where “ladders” allow bribes to be passed up the hierarchy and protection to be passed 
 
 
11
down, the elite’s attitudes to law obedience would affect the extent of police corruption rather 
directly.  
Our second instrument is a question from the World Values Survey on the extent to 
which people think bribery is ever justifiable. Our reason for including this instrument is simply 
that the extent to which people justify bribery may affect their willingness to pay bribes. 
 
3. Description of Endogenous Variables 
Crime and Crime Reporting 
The data for crime and crime reporting comes from the International Crime Victim Surveys 
(ICVS), which have been conducted starting from 1989 by a group of international research in-
stitutes under the coordination of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research 
Institute. Four rounds of the ICVS were conducted for selected countries, distributed irregularly 
over the years 1989, 1992, 1996/1997, and 2000. Unlike the official crime statistics, such as the 
United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, the ICVS 
uses crime information collected from the households. The victimization surveys arguably better 
reflect the crime rates for at least two reasons: First crimes may be under-reported to the police, 
and underreported by the police to the UN (Soares, 2004a). Improvement in the police capacity 
or efficiency will tend to increase the reported crime rates. Second, crime statistics may not be 
comparable across countries. Official police figures vary because of differences in legal defini-
tions, recording practices, and precise rules for classifying and counting incidents.  But most im-
portantly they appear to suffer from systematic under-reporting of crimes in the most misgov-
erned countries (Soares 2004a), which would seriously bias any attempt to estimate the link be-
tween corruption and crime using official figures.  
The sample of countries in the ICVS covers 67 countries. In the ICVS research project 
the statisticians have made great efforts in making the definitions comparable. A problem with 
these statistics when comparing countries is, however, that they have been collected at different 
points of time. For example, global shifts in protection technology reducing some crime rates 
may make the cross-country statistics less comparable. In addition for several poor countries they 
are only representative for the populations in larger(st) cities[y]. While we have examined 
whether this causes a serious bias and found no evidence for it, it would be far more preferable to 
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have data on representative samples. All things considered, it is the best set of statistics available 
for our purposes (i.e., much better than official police reported data). 
We construct five categories of crime:  
 
(i) Vehicle-related Theft: Theft of cars, motorcycles and bicycles; theft from cars 
(ii) Other theft:   Theft of personal property, theft from garage/lockups 
(iii) Burglary:   Burglary and attempted burglary 
(iv) Robbery:   Theft with violence or threat of violence 
(v) Assault:   Violence without theft 
 
We also create a composite crime index (and a corresponding crime reporting index), which is 
equal to the simple average of the above five crime categories. 
As discussed in Soares (2004a) the primary distinction between theft and burglary is that 
thefts do not involve invasion of a house or a building. Unlike Soares, we take into account the 
distinction between thefts that involve vehicles (cars, motorcycles, bicycles) and other types of 
theft. The poor are less likely to be subject to the first simply because they may not be able to 
afford cars or motorcycles. The fourth category, robbery, is a special case of contact crimes, 
which involve some sort of violence. The fifth variable, assault also involves violence for the 
victim, but not necessarily any monetary gain for the criminal. 
 
Police Corruption 
Obtaining an accurate, direct measurement of corruption is in most cases impossible given the 
secretive nature of corrupt transactions and the lack of incentives for the involved parties to re-
veal information. Various methods have been used in the literature for finding signals that may 
reveal the size of the phenomenon. Crime records, surveys of households’ reported experience, 
polls of experts, case studies, etc. have all been applied – each with its own weaknesses. 
Crime records (number of police officers sentenced or prosecuted or reported for corrup-
tion) may appear at first to provide the most straightforward method of measurement. Their ac-
curacy, however, depends on the honesty and effectiveness of law enforcement agencies. The 
honesty of law enforcement agencies is, however, related to the average corruption level in the 
bureaucracy itself. And the bureaucracy is often quite dishonest. The police’s dishonesty is evi-
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denced, among other things, by the reluctance of victims to report crimes to them. When asked, 
households often cite fear and dislike of the police as one reason for not reporting a crime. If cor-
rupt, the police might not report the crimes they have profited from.  
It has already been demonstrated that the accuracy problems of police reports are so se-
vere that using data on crimes from the police leads to seriously biased and misleading results 
when regarded as accurate signals of actual crime levels (Soares 2004a, Azfar and Gurgur 2004). 
The problems in using data from the police on police corruption in any direct way would be even 
worse. Conducting interviews with experts may circumvent this measurement problem that 
causes endogeneity, but this also injects some subjectivity that may hinder cross-country com-
parisons.  
Many surveys only ask about opinions not experiences. When citizens are asked to rate 
the corruption in police organizations (e.g. public opinion survey that was conducted by Gallup 
International in 1996 in 37 countries), it is not clear whether their answers to the questions are 
based on their personal experience or their general impression about the police (shaped by their 
social or economic background, political views, or reporting by the media). 
However, the police corruption variable that we use in this study, based on ICVS data, 
asks citizens to report specific incidents where they have actually been asked to pay bribes by a 
police officer. Assuming that the sampling procedure in each country produces a reasonably rep-
resentative sample they provide a fairly accurate way of measuring police corruption – though 
there are obviously still concerns about respondents misreporting police corruption to survey-
ors.1  
he exact wording of the question is as follows: 
 
n your country 
asked you, or expected you to pay a bribe for his or her services?  
                                                
T
In some countries, there is a problem of corruption among government or public 
officials. During [the year the survey was conducted], has any government offi-
cial, for instance a customs officer, a police officer or inspector i
 
1 This is a problem for all research on corruption [or more generally any sensitive subject] that uses survey data. 
Azfar and Murrell (2009) try to estimate the extent of this problem and suggest a mechanism for mitigating it by 
identifying reticent respondents and treating their responses differently from respondents who appear more reliable. 
The technique however needs the inclusion of a module in the survey to identify reticent respondents, which has not 
yet been included in a crime victimization survey. Including such a module in a crime survey is a promising avenue 
for future research.  
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What type of official was involved? Was it a government official, a customs offi-
cer, a police officer, or some sort of inspector?  
 
Based on this question we construct a police corruption variable. We assign 1 to a household 
who reports an incidence of corruption involving police officers, and 0 to all other respondents. 
Then, we simply use the country averages to measure police corruption in each country. 
To what extent is this variable compatible with other corruption measures? One of the 
most widely used corruption variables has been constructed by the World Bank Institute as a part 
of its Governance Indicators, labeled “Control of Corruption” (Kauffman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
2003). The simple correlation between our police corruption variable and the Bank’s corruption 
measure is quite high: 0.58. The correlation with Transparency International’s widely used Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index is 0.51 (the Transparency International Index is available on their web-
site and the methodology described by Lambsdorf 2005).  
 
 
4. Preliminary Analysis 
The variables and data sources are described in Table 1 and descriptive statistics of variables are 
shown in Table 2. We present crime rates and crime reporting rates for each country in Table 3. 
Among the respondents (who own a car), 18 percent have suffered from a car theft in the last two 
years.The theft rate varies from 3 percent (Malta) to 34 percent (Mongolia) across countries. 
Small-scale theft has been experienced by 13 percent of the sampled households during the last 
two years; burglary incidence is lower at 11 percent, but varies more across countries.  
Most crimes do not get reported. On the average, 52 percent of car thefts, 49 percent of 
burglaries, 28 percent of small thefts, 37 percent of robberies, and 27 percent of assaults are re-
ported to the police.2  
Table 4 presents simple cross-country correlations. A number of interesting patterns ap-
pear. For instance, the crime rates for the different types of crime tend to strongly covary. Even 
the correlation between other theft (theft of non-car items without violence) and assault (violence 
                                                 
2 The low report rate corresponds to our own experience, the two co-authors together have been victimized over 10 
times and have reported a crime to the police only once: Azfar used personal contacts in the police for the recovery 
of an important letter that accompanied a valued personal article – the article was not recovered, having been stolen 
during a customs inspection, but the letter was. 
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without theft) is strong, 0.68. Crime-reporting rates also covary except for assault.  An interest-
ing new variable based on “real” data, the non-payment of parking tickets by diplomats in New 
York (Fisman and Miguel), which is a proxy for corruption in the elite in an atmosphere of non-
enforcement, correlates positively with crime and police corruption, and negatively with crime 
reporting.  
 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
We begin with OLS to get an idea about the basic relationships among the variables. Although 
the results are likely to be affected by several potential endogeneity problems, it is nevertheless 
helpful to establish some basic links between variables. We start with the base model in which 
each of the three equations is estimated separately. We consider each crime category one by one. 
Then, we estimate each equation using the composite crime variable (and the corresponding 
composite crime-reporting variable). Next, we include or exclude various variables to understand 
the robustness of the model. For example, what happens if we exclude crime reporting from the 
crime equation? What happens if we add previously excluded variables to each model?  
Then we use 2SLS (two-stage-least-squares) and 3SLS (three-stage-least-squares), where 
endogeneity in crime, crime reporting, and police corruption is addressed using the aforemen-
tioned instruments.3 
 
OLS Results 
Crime 
Let us look at the OLS estimation of crime rates. As shown in Table 5, the predictive power of 
the model is at its highest in robbery (R2=0.73) and weakest in other theft (R2=0.63), and in gen-
eral the fit is quite good. Police corruption is significant in every crime category, except for 
                                                 
3 The difference between 2SLS and 3SLS is the variance-covariance matrix of the estimators. 2SLS ignores the po-
tential correlation between the error terms across equations and assumes that the error term in one equation is inde-
pendent of the error term in another equation. Since 3SLS does not have this restriction, it is more efficient than 
2SLS. On the other hand, if there is an error in one equation (omitted variable, etc.), not only do the estimators of 
that equation become biased, but the estimators of other equations may become biased as well. Due to the interde-
pendency in the variance-covariance matrix, problems in one equation propagate to other systems in 3SLS. In 2SLS, 
however, an error in one equation causes biased results in that equation only. In conclusion, if there are serious 
doubts about model specification, 2SLS is preferred to 3SLS. If the model is believed to be well-specified, 3SLS 
should be preferred. 
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“other theft” and “robbery”. The effect of crime reporting on crime, while substantial in magni-
tude is statistically insignificant for most crimes. Note that in each column the coefficient of 
crime reporting has a negative sign, suggesting that there might be a negative link between crime 
and crime reporting (eg. more reporting reduces crime or vice versa).  The effect of crime report-
ing on robbery is large and significant. We report Beta coefficients, so the coefficient of 0.36, 
like most other coefficients represents an elasticity: taken literally this means a doubling of the 
crime reporting rate would lead to a 36% decline in robbery.  The coefficients of discrete vari-
ables like “Death Penalty” or “Abortion Legal” mean that the presence of these laws has an ef-
fect as large in percentage terms as the coefficient (for example, a coefficient of -0.10 means that 
the presence of Death Penalty reduces the likelihood of crimes by 10%). 
The coefficient of income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, has the expected 
positive sign and is significant in all crime categories, except for “other theft”.  Among the other 
three conceptually important variables, education (measured by literacy rate) is significant with 
the expected negative coefficient in all crime categories (except for other theft), urbanization is 
significant in only two crime categories (car related theft and robbery) with the expected positive 
coefficient; and the ethnic differences variable is significant with the expected positive coeffi-
cient in assault. 
The three variables that we use as instruments later in our analysis have the predicted 
signs. Death penalty has a negative coefficient, albeit significant in only one category: robbery 
(the death penalty may be a better measure for the severity with which robbery is punished than 
the severity of punishing petty theft). The legalization of abortion is not significant. One factor 
that may lower the significance of abortion may be that it works with a long lag, (according to 
Donahue and Levitt’s conjecture about how abortion reduces crime, one has to wait for un-
wanted fetuses to not be born, not grow up and not commit crimes, before legalizing abortion has 
an effect on reducing crime) and we don’t have the data to construct the correct lagged variable. 
Finally, the proportion of young people in the population has positive coefficients across the 
board, statistically significant in car related theft, other theft, and burglary.  
The composite crime variable is presented in column 6. The fit of the regression is good 
(R2=0.69). Police corruption appears to increase crime. Crime reporting has the expected nega-
tive sign but it is not significant. The coefficient of the crime-reporting variable is smaller than 
for each individual crime. This makes sense since the reporting of a crime should really only re-
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duce the frequency of that crime. The literacy rate appears to reduce crime, whereas urbaniza-
tion, and the proportion of the young in the population appear to increase it. All in all, the model 
results are mostly in line with the literature.  
 
Crime Reporting 
Next, we repeat the same exercise for crime reporting in Table 6. The predictive power of the 
model is less strong than that of the crime model. The R2 varies from 0.27 (assault) to 0.53 (other 
theft). Police corruption has a negative coefficient for reporting in all crime categories, but sig-
nificant only in car theft and burglary. Crime incidence has negative and significant coefficients 
in 4 of 5 crime categories. Income inequality is significant only for the reporting of ‘other theft’, 
though it has the predicted sign (negative) in all five categories. Urbanization is significant in all 
crime categories, whereas ethnolinguistic fractionalization is not significant at all. The literacy 
rate has the wrong (negative) sign, and the coefficient is significant in the car theft and robbery 
regressions.   
In column 6 we present the results of the composite crime reporting equation. The fit of 
the regression is good (R2=0.55). Police corruption reduces crime reporting, as does crime. The 
literacy rate surprisingly reduces crime reporting. As expected, the urbanization rate appears to 
increase it.  
 
Police Corruption  
Finally, we estimate the police corruption equation using OLS. The results are presented in Table 
7. The model in column (6) that involves aggregate crime statistics explains about 48 percent of 
the variation in police corruption. Crime incidence is not significant, whereas crime reporting is 
significant with the predicted negative coefficient, suggesting an inverse link between police cor-
ruption and the crime-reporting rate. Literacy rate has statistically significant coefficient with 
negative sign, i.e. police corruption decreases with education. The link between police corruption 
and urbanization, seems to be positive. Ethnic fractionalization is marginally significant with 
positive coefficient, which means that police corruption tends to be higher in countries with eth-
nic differences. The coefficient of income inequality has the expected negative sign, but is not 
statistically significant.  
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System of Equations: 2SLS and 3SLS results  
Our system consists of three equations – one for each endogenous variable. First, we used 2SLS 
to estimate system coefficients. Then, we repeat the same exercise using 3SLS. Note that since 
3SLS yields more efficient results than 2SLS, we expect that the number of variables with statis-
tically significant coefficients under 3SLS would be higher than those under 2SLS. However, 
3SLS results are more vulnerable to model specification errors than 2SLS. 
As explained above, we used a set of instruments in our paper. Severity of punishment, 
Young population, Legality of abortion, Trust and Attitudes towards theft for crime rates;  Social 
activism for crime reporting; Parking tickets of diplomats, and Social norms about bribery for 
police corruption. To test whether the over-identifying restrictions are justified, we use the 
Hausman test.4 The test results show no indication that the equation is mis-specified. Endogene-
ity of these instruments is tested by Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.5 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
results also did not indicate any problem with the instruments.  
The results for the model are presented in Table 8 and 9, using 2SLS and 3SLS, respec-
tively. We discuss 2SLS first:.  
The impact of crime reporting on crime is large but not quite significant.  The coefficient 
of 0.45 suggests that a doubling of crime reporting would lead to a 45% reduction in the crime 
rate, but the t stat of 1.42 is not quite significant. Two variables are significant at 5 percent: ur-
banization rate (positive sign) and the death penalty (negative sign). Two other variables are 
marginally significant: Legality of abortion (unexpected positive sign) and Justification of buy-
ing stolen goods (expected positive sign).   
In the crime reporting regression, both endogenous variable crime rates and police cor-
ruption have the correct negative sign, and t-stats above 1.5 but neither coefficient is statistically 
                                                 
4 The Hausman test is based on regressing the residuals from the main equation on the entire set of exogenous vari-
ables. Under the null hypothesis of over-identifying restrictions, the test statistic, NR2 (N is the sample size and R2 
is the uncentred goodness of fit from the regression of residuals on all the instruments) has a chi-square distribution 
with K-T degrees of freedom, where K is the number of exogenous variables and T is the number of endogenous 
variables. If the instruments are excluded from the structural equation correctly, the set of instruments should have 
no explaining power over the residuals and consequently the R2 should be low. 
5 We conduct the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for each of the instruments as well as the control variables. The test is 
based on the existence of two alternative estimators: one is consistent and asymptotically efficient under the null 
hypothesis and the other is consistent under the null and alternative hypothesis, but not efficient under the null hy-
pothesis. The null hypothesis states that the variables, which are assumed to be exogenous, are indeed so. In the al-
ternative hypothesis a variable that previously enters the system exogenously is treated as endogenous and estimated 
using other exogenous variables (without specifying a structural equation). If the difference between estimates is 
“large enough” we reject the null hypothesis that the variable in question is exogenous.  
 
 
19
significant. Literacy has a counterintuitive negative sign and urbanization has a positive sign. 
These are the only significant variables.  
The police corruption equation has two variables that are statistically significant. Crime 
reporting tends to reduce police corruption.  The impact of crime reporting on police corruption 
is the only clearly significant effect of one endogenous variable on another.  Note that it is pre-
sent in OLS (Table 7), as well. The literacy rate leads to lower corruption rate 
Looking at 3SLS results in Table 15, we observe that four of the six endogenous vari-
ables have significant coefficients of the expected sign. The effect of crime reporting on police 
corruption is highly significant (t=3.31 P<0.01). Crime reporting also has a significant negative 
effect on crime. Both police corruption and crime have a significant negative effect on crime re-
porting.    
 
7. Conclusion 
The literature on governance has recently expanded, connecting governance to a host of depend-
ent and independent variables using various econometric techniques. In this paper we aim to con-
tribute to research on governance and social outcomes by investigating the causal links between 
crime, crime reporting, and police corruption. In particular, we examine how a variable related to 
the probability of being caught (police corruption) is related to crime rates and crime reporting.  
All in all, we found that crime rates, crime reporting, and police corruption jointly deter-
mine each other and there are significant interactions among those variables. In the most plausi-
ble specification (Model 8), which uses 2SLS to estimate the six possible causal relationships 
between the three independent variables, we find that crime reporting has a significant negative 
effect on police corruption. Note that the crime reporting variable is constructed from the report-
ing on crimes like theft, and not reporting on police corruption itself, so this is a reliable result 
and not due to some statistical artifact.      
This important result indicates that elements of social structure which make it more likely 
that citizens will report crimes – either because they believe it’s the right thing to do, of because 
they hope to gain some redress – will reduce police corruption because the police will be de-
terred by the possibility they themselves may be reported. 
A number of other relationships are of substantial magnitudes but not quite significant in 
2SLS. In 3SLS, which is more sensitive to mis-specification bias, but likely to give more precise 
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estimates if the model is correctly specified, we find 4 significant relationships: crime reporting 
reduces both crime and police corruption; and both crime and police corruption reduce crime re-
porting.  
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Table 1: Description of Variables 
 
Variable Description Source 
Car Theft 
Proportion of people who have experienced a vehicle-related theft in 
the last two years (theft of cars, theft from cars, theft of motorcycles 
and bicycles) 
ICVS 
Other Theft 
Proportion of people who have experienced other theft in the last 
two years 
ICVS 
Burglary 
Proportion of people who have experienced burglary in the last two 
years (burglary and attempt at burglary) 
ICVS 
Robbery 
Proportion of people who have experienced robbery in the last two 
years 
ICVS 
Assault 
Proportion of people who have experienced assault in the last two 
years 
ICVS 
Reporting Car Theft Proportion of crime victims who report a vehicle related theft ICVS 
Reporting Other 
Theft Proportion of crime victims who report other theft ICVS 
Reporting Burglary Proportion of crime victims who report a burglary ICVS 
Reporting Robbery Proportion of crime victims who report a robbery ICVS 
Reporting Assault 
Proportion of crime victims who report an assault to the police that 
they have experienced in the last two years ICVS 
Police Corruption Proportion of households who have faced police corruption in the last two years ICVS 
Control of Corruption Control of corruption – Governance Indicator World Bank 
Income Inequality Gini coefficient World Bank 
Education Literacy rate among adult households World Bank 
Urbanization Percentage of population living in urban areas World Bank 
Ethnic Differences The probability that two randomly selected people in a country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group La Porta et al. (1998) 
Death Penalty Whether death penalty exists in the judicial system and is enforced in the last 10 years Amnesty International 
Young Population Proportion of households between the ages 15-24 World Bank 
Abortion Laws Whether abortion is permitted without any restriction or permitted on socio-economic grounds 
http://www.reproductiveri
ghts.org 
Democracy Democracy score, average of the 1970-1994 period La Porta et al. (1998) 
Red Tape Number of procedures to start up a new business Djankov et al.(2002) 
Judicial Formalism Duration of enforcement in days (from notification to actual en-forcement) Djankov et al.(2002) 
Access to sea 
The ratio of population living within 60 miles to open sea or ocean is 
related to geography. 
Fisman and Miguel 
(2006) 
Parking Tickets 
The number of parking violations committed by diplomats in New 
York City (per diplomat) 
Fisman and Miguel 
(2006) 
Trust Level of trust within the society to other people World Values Survey 
Membership  
Proportion of people who are members of organizations (environ-
ment, education, arts) World Values Survey 
Social Activism The proportion of people who have signed a petition to government World Values Survey 
Justify Bribery The proportion of people who justify bribery World Values Survey 
Justify Stealing The proportion of people who justify buying stolen goods World Values Survey 
 
 
 
25
 
 
26
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Crime rate (average) 66 0.10453 0.05645 0.02562 0.27328
Car Theft 67 0.18089 0.06984 0.05235 0.35171
Other Theft 67 0.13370 0.08228 0.00472 0.35253
Burglary 67 0.10996 0.08914 0.00846 0.40281
Robbery 66 0.03877 0.04019 0.00023 0.18587
Assault 67 0.06347 0.03972 0.01052 0.18492
Reporting crime (average) 66 0.38464 0.11250 0.15392 0.61327
Reporting Car Theft 67 0.51769 0.16518 0.18110 0.83636
Reporting Other Theft 67 0.27926 0.15099 0.03175 0.62694
Reporting Burglary 67 0.49024 0.14212 0.21237 0.80000
Reporting Robbery 66 0.37746 0.14475 0.00000 0.69565
Reporting Assault 67 0.27000 0.10834 0.08589 0.72000
Control of Corruption 67 0.40119 1.18004 -1.27000 2.58000
Police Corruption 53 0.02701 0.03491 0.00000 0.16906
Gini Coefficient 67 40.093 12.2206 22.0000 74.6100
Literacy Rate 67 87.4179 16.8416 33.0000 100.000
Urbanization 67 57.3881 21.5111 10.0000 96.0000
Ethnic Differences 67 0.35146 0.24230 0.00200 0.93020
Death Penalty 65 0.23077 0.42460 0.00000 1.00000
Young Population (log) 67 2.70100 1.05689 -0.85360 4.85280
Abortion Legal 67 3.70149 1.70574 0.00000 5.00000
Democracy 66 5.56402 3.96345 0.00000 10.0000
No of Procedures (log) 64 2.19376 0.49547 0.69315 2.94444
Duration of Enforcement (log) 64 3.64824 0.96519 0.69315 5.12396
Parking Tickets (log) 63 1.82721 1.42026 0.00000 4.94591
Population near Sea (log) 65 0.49389 0.36217 0.00000 1.00000
Trust others 55 0.29555 0.14750 0.04630 0.63734
Membership 47 0.07429 0.04524 0.02412 0.24355
Social Activism 54 0.55781 0.13649 0.24992 0.83470
Justify Stolen Goods 49 0.08734 0.03772 0.02180 0.20329
Justify Bribery 55 0.08760 0.05206 0.00990 0.26872
Table 3: Crime Data (presented in percentages) 
 
Country 
Crime 
rate Car Theft 
Other 
Theft  Burglary Robbery 
Reporting 
Car Theft 
Reporting 
Other 
Theft  
Reporting 
Burglary  
Reporting 
Robbery  
Reporting 
Assault 
Police Cor-
ruption 
ALBANIA 25.69 18.90 9..33 4.46 5.04 27.71 9.53 37.86 21.65 27.83 0.54
ARGENTINA 26.81 10.71 10.53 12.83 5.51 42.06 24.52 34.72 36.92 30.85 5.49
AUSTRALIA 11.83 8.20 8.41 1.17 7.18 65.04 37.12 67.62 50.00 39.05 0.11
AUSTRIA 5.24 5.45 1.49 0.21 2.41 76.81 48.05 52.38 33.33 11.76 0.14
AZERBAIJAN 9.35 4.60 1.95 1.95 2.41 38.89 5.00 31.25 47.06 38.10 3.29
BELARUS 12.80 10.20 11.02 1.99 4.15 41.86 15.58 46.00 26.67 16.49 0.87
BELGIUM 9.38 5.29 5.06 1.40 3.48 76.92 54.88 68.90 51.28 31.28 0.09
BOLIVIA 17.21 27.18 23.34 8.90 10.08 22.09 3.17 25.23 13.41 13.04 10.62
BOTSWANA 24.69 14.96 20.51 3.84 11.96 60.11 33.60 63.27 42.19 23.59 0.35
BRAZIL 15.62 16.87 5.92 14.88 8.93 34.60 6.01 30.63 15.00 8.59 7.78
BULGARIA 27.49 15.95 12.56 2.85 5.27 39.26 16.40 53.82 42.03 21.14 3.88
CAMBODIA 18.55 12.20 23.55 1.69 7.22 32.61 10.08 21.59 54.17 30.14 7.21
CANADA 12.47 7.44 6.02 1.35 5.82 61.08 35.15 65.48 49.53 35.89 0.15
CHINA 18.64 8.53 2.72 0.75 2.35 44.41 19.38 35.29 35.71 40.91 ..
COLOMBIA 31.59 26.92 20.12 16.40 14.69 33.40 16.63 32.69 20.00 16.09 8.19
COSTA RICA 18.58 15.95 18.72 6.28 6.32 29.08 17.52 34.51 23.89 29.82 2.35
CROATIA 8.79 4.27 3.34 1.31 3.22 55.56 50.50 47.37 51.61 23.29 2.60
CZECH REP. 25.14 15.95 11.46 1.80 5.32 65.63 39.38 65.89 46.48 27.75 1.31
DENMARK 11.84 4.88 3.65 0.67 3.06 67.95 51.82 70.59 63.16 32.94 0.04
EGYPT 20.58 24.55 10.67 3.42 4.21 56.07 26.96 42.86 29.03 15.79 ..
ESTONIA 19.70 11.24 9.10 3.60 7.02 46.81 27.68 35.38 33.59 20.08 0.30
FINLAND 9.34 4.63 1.34 0.77 5.24 61.43 36.41 39.60 40.00 21.13 0.00
FRANCE 12.86 4.46 4.60 1.10 4.43 67.99 48.28 60.68 58.33 34.72 0.21
GEORGIA 23.05 14.57 9.91 3.53 3.36 25.72 10.73 46.38 24.24 15.94 5.32
GERMANY 9.91 5.00 2.99 0.99 3.94 79.09 38.43 75.71 55.32 16.39 ..
HUNGARY 20.18 9.76 7.71 2.16 4.05 64.24 33.82 60.00 35.56 10.47 0.38
INDIA 10.32 16.41 5.48 1.24 3.60 81.71 20.42 51.85 45.83 20.83 4.38
INDONESIA 12.82 11.20 9.95 1.84 3.89 38.77 38.30 42.66 33.33 24.57 16.91
ITALY 15.12 6.01 4.43 2.00 1.21 54.51 37.72 51.19 39.47 30.43  ..
JAPAN 9.25 0.47 2.02 0.02 1.05 49.18 50.00 54.76 0.00 31.82 0.00
KOREA, SOUTH 16.69 3.45 10.14 0.47 2.14 18.11 18.18 34.54 22.22 24.39 1.27
KYRGYZ REP. 15.14 19.18 12.00 2.93 10.03 30.22 10.13 42.64 20.83 16.67 4.80
LATVIA 17.85 16.85 7.84 3.93 4.93 43.73 13.85 34.78 34.78 23.93 3.15
LESOTHO 19.17 16.51 17.74 4.55 10.98 38.33 16.78 57.06 29.73 25.24 ..
LITHUANIA 23.21 12.77 12.12 3.75 5.57 45.00 17.48 46.46 45.65 25.74 1.72
MACEDONIA 18.12 10.40 5.79 1.68 4.73 44.55 35.29 39.47 36.36 38.71 0.76
MALTA 13.21 3.30 2.35 0.43 4.37 62.04 38.71 50.00 50.00 34.15 0.32
MONGOLIA 30.42 34.20 20.15 5.28 10.16 31.69 12.63 56.93 34.29 20.20 2.58
MOZAMBIQUE 35.17 25.99 40.28 18.59 16.61 29.23 10.78 21.24 15.13 19.72 ..
NAMIBIA 28.84 18.98 27.49 8.57 11.51 59.04 11.67 58.46 27.38 24.11 ..
NETHERLANDS 15.56 6.05 5.00 1.05 4.83 67.69 53.67 72.39 56.96 37.60 0.05
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Country 
Crime 
rate Car Theft 
Other 
Theft  Burglary Robbery 
Reporting 
Car Theft 
Reporting 
Other 
Theft  
Reporting 
Burglary  
Reporting 
Robbery  
Reporting 
Assault 
Police Cor-
ruption 
NEW ZEALAND 17.11 14.06 10.16 0.94 7.72 78.78 54.07 70.10 61.11 42.57 ..
NIGERIA 18.97 22.92 13.28 8.90 11.12 52.24 14.71 43.90 38.96 18.18 12.59
NORWAY 7.02 3.07 0.85 0.63 3.28 56.67 25.00 80.00 50.00 26.67 ..
PANAMA 18.24 10.55 15.03 3.31 6.52 39.42 27.59 29.37 30.77 28.30 2.97
PARAGUAY 20.84 20.07 24.18 10.22 6.18 46.25 23.85 37.69 12.50 32.35 2.92
PHILIPPINES 13.04 10.69 4.91 2.25 1.79 24.85 12.08 29.06 25.53 32.88 1.07
POLAND 13.06 8.03 4.43 2.52 4.37 51.26 22.03 44.24 31.60 29.81 2.17
PORTUGAL 10.21 2.67 3.68 1.60 1.66 43.23 32.00 36.23 46.67 20.00 0.64
ROMANIA 20.25 18.99 5.34 1.77 5.79 56.54 20.35 49.22 25.64 21.48 0.59
RUSSIA 21.06 15.40 7.31 4.52 6.64 32.14 17.03 40.00 27.89 24.31 3.64
SLOVAK REP. 24.21 14.91 8.40 1.85 4.17 64.58 62.69 59.26 50.00 30.91 4.30
SLOVENIA 11.43 4.86 4.55 1.38 4.91 60.88 38.73 42.86 38.89 30.41 0.04
SOUTH AFRICA 25.91 13.04 15.60 7.80 12.10 64.84 27.18 54.64 40.25 27.13 1.60
SPAIN 17.26 4.81 4.66 2.88 2.29 39.06 41.92 35.33 19.55 24.55 ..
SWAZILAND 34.73 26.53 34.57 9.41 16.86 63.33 23.45 69.13 59.04 19.35 ..
SWEDEN 14.49 6.69 2.70 0.52 4.33 69.18 49.15 51.69 69.57 28.57 0.07
SWITZERLAND 9.55 6.48 3.58 0.89 3.07 73.42 47.59 64.14 53.85 31.46 0.21
TANZANIA 29.65 24.72 15.38  6.54 0 83.64 26.51 58.91 ..  62.07 ..
TUNISIA 30.55 26.23 17.01 8.12 2.87 65.85 38.03 56.29 42.11 72.00 ..
UGANDA 22.31 35.25 29.49 8.25 13.28 51.37 6.82 36.09 25.86 14.95 3.10
UKRAINE 15.81 24.26 8.16 4.90 5.32 35.80 13.32 45.41 31.13 20.66 1.21
UNITED KING. 14.37 5.64 5.95 1.18 5.29 78.25 50.12 74.17 57.78 37.44 0.08
UNITED 
STATES 12.40 7.18 7.41 1.79 6.23 62.08 40.64 64.82 62.69 44.44 0.11
YUGOSLAVIA 19.80 12.71 6.34 1.36 9.27 45.63 20.93 44.62 35.71 22.11 6.95
ZAMBIA 23.99 22.22 37.31 7.46 18.49 62.65 12.00 54.83 26.47 21.14 ..
ZIMBABWE 17.52 23.35 17.71 4.78 12.87 56.34 21.00 52.44 35.56 14.05 1.70
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Table 4: Simple Correlation Results: 
* Significant at 5% 
 
 Crime rate Car Theft 
Other 
Theft  Burglary Robbery  Assault  
Crime rate (average) 1  
Car Theft 0.8661* 1  
Other Theft 0.8923* 0.7275* 1  
Burglary 0.9264* 0.7251* 0.7400* 1  
Robbery 0.8140* 0.6713* 0.6666* 0.6923* 1 
Assault 0.8483* 0.6014* 0.6761* 0.8273* 0.6700* 1
Reporting crime (average) -0.4272* -0.3032* -0.4451* -0.3626* -0.4998* -0.2682*
Reporting Car Theft -0.2963* -0.2231 -0.2373 -0.2222 -0.3555* -0.0946
Reporting Other Theft -0.5466* -0.3819* -0.5706* -0.4773* -0.5072* -0.4303*
Reporting Burglary -0.2343 -0.1413 -0.2135 -0.1911 -0.3917* -0.0605
Reporting Robbery -0.3580* -0.2507* -0.3764* -0.3033* -0.4580* -0.1858
Reporting Assault -0.24 0.0313 -0.183 -0.1563 -0.2432* -0.3072*
Control of Corruption -0.5573* -0.5190* -0.6083* -0.4730* -0.4484* -0.3327*
Police Corruption 0.4277* 0.2380 0.4206* 0.3672* 0.4781* 0.3427*
Gini Coefficient 0.6419* 0.4284* 0.5383* 0.6254* 0.5979* 0.6368*
Literacy Rate -0.6180* -0.4149* -0.5709* -0.6391* -0.4832* -0.5167*
Urbanization -0.4693* -0.3028* -0.5064* -0.5232* -0.2582* -0.4031*
Ethnic Differences 0.4780* 0.2871* 0.5024* 0.4306* 0.4263* 0.5423*
Death Penalty 0.081 0.0179 0.2277 0.1057 -0.0786 0.0869
Young Population (log) 0.6283* 0.5068* 0.6793* 0.5969* 0.4387* 0.4442*
Abortion Legal -0.3235* -0.1688 -0.3157* -0.3443* -0.4090* -0.2796*
Democracy -0.4671* -0.4502* -0.5098* -0.4208* -0.3328* -0.2686*
No of Procedures (log) 0.3577* 0.3159* 0.3642* 0.3015* 0.4656* 0.109
Duration of Enforcement (log) 0.2867* 0.2336 0.2213 0.2768* 0.3608* 0.1319
Parking Tickets (log) 0.4707* 0.4483* 0.4700* 0.4075* 0.3803* 0.3041*
Population near Sea (log) -0.4806* -0.3324* -0.5020* -0.4063* -0.4023* -0.5420*
Trust others -0.4958* -0.4170* -0.4665* -0.4403* -0.5142* -0.3801*
Membership 0.001 0.0846 0.1499 0.1903 -0.1024 0.1993
Social Activism -0.235 -0.1943 -0.2669 -0.1621 -0.2307 -0.0493
Justify Stolen Goods 0.2092 0.3324* 0.2187 0.2143 -0.0263 -0.0345
Justify Bribery 0.0407 -0.0034 0.0339 -0.0089 0.0928 -0.1056
 
 
 
29
Table 4 (continued): Simple Correlation Results: 
* Significant at 5% 
 
 
Reporting 
crime 
Reporting 
Car Theft 
Reporting 
Other 
Theft  
Reporting 
Burglary 
Reporting 
Robbery 
Reporting 
Assault  
Control of 
Corruption
Police Cor-
ruption 
Reporting crime (average) 1       
Reporting Car Theft 0.8869* 1       
Reporting Other Theft 0.8427* 0.6830* 1  
Reporting Burglary 0.8320* 0.7504* 0.5906* 1  
Reporting Robbery 0.8254* 0.6637* 0.5650* 0.6100* 1  
Reporting Assault 0.5280* 0.3281* 0.3728* 0.2605* 0.3926* 1 
Control of Corruption 0.7219* 0.5752* 0.7047* 0.6020* 0.5417* 0.1996 1
Police Corruption -0.4699* -0.4247* -0.4016* -0.4441* -0.2917* -0.3621* -0.5834* 1
Gini Coefficient -0.4205* -0.3089* -0.5331* -0.224 -0.3427* -0.2214 -0.4249* 0.4088*
Literacy Rate 0.3025* 0.1215 0.4147* 0.3250* 0.1771 0.1441 0.4615* -0.5007*
Urbanization 0.4734* 0.2636* 0.5347* 0.3998* 0.3095* 0.153 0.5984* -0.3768*
Ethnic Differences -0.3462* -0.1347 -0.3661* -0.2144 -0.2816* -0.2164 -0.3970* 0.5364*
Death Penalty -0.1248 -0.0129 -0.1365 0.0293 -0.1651 -0.0373 -0.2243 0.2057
Young Population (log) -0.6600* -0.4332* -0.7004* -0.5093* -0.5079* -0.175 -0.7602* -0.5118*
Abortion Legal 0.3730* 0.2162 0.2715* 0.3198* 0.3916* 0.0784 0.2832* -0.3979*
Democracy 0.5404* 0.4263* 0.5597* 0.4470* 0.3920* 0.0567 0.7502* -0.5057*
No of Procedures (log) -0.6249* -0.4853* -0.4469* -0.5990* -0.5770* -0.2238 -0.7012* 0.4034*
Duration of Enforcement (log) -0.4861* -0.3349* -0.3368* -0.4700* -0.4430* -0.3409* -0.5572* 0.3927*
Parking Tickets (log) -0.3624* -0.2459 -0.3424* -0.2597* -0.3365* -0.1982 -0.5523* 0.3402*
Population near Sea (log) 0.2915* 0.1217 0.4683* 0.1604 0.1732 0.0856 0.3107* -0.2947*
Trust others 0.5393* 0.3301* 0.4689* 0.4868* 0.4491* 0.2316 0.6222* -0.1670
Membership 0.3350* 0.3763* 0.1333 0.3134* 0.3578* 0.4563* 0.2211 -0.2995
Social Activism 0.5298* 0.4510* 0.5082* 0.4166* 0.4394* 0.2895* 0.6150* -0.3762*
Justify Stolen Goods -0.122 -0.1986 -0.0539 -0.1056 -0.0835 -0.0247 -0.3759* 0.0106
Justify Bribery -0.1899 -0.2014 -0.1934 -0.1604 -0.1269 -0.1779 -0.2265 -0.0615
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Table 4 (continued): Simple Correlation Results: 
* Significant at 5% 
 
Gini Coef-
ficient 
Literacy 
Rate Urbanization
Ethnic Dif-
ferences 
Death Pen-
alty 
Young 
Population 
(log) 
Abortion 
Legal 
Gini Coefficient 1  
Literacy Rate -0.4614* 1  
Urbanization -0.4377* 0.7267* 1  
Ethnic Differences 0.3937* -0.3200* -0.3188* 1  
Death Penalty 0.2246 -0.3698* -0.4185* 0.1498 1 
Young Population (log) 0.5122* -0.6668* -0.8227* 0.3811* 0.3572* 1
Abortion Legal -0.5061* 0.4063* 0.3307* -0.1817 -0.3414* -0.3602* 1
Democracy -0.3477* 0.5038* 0.5865* -0.1759 -0.2821* -0.7187* 0.4143*
No of Procedures (log) 0.3251* -0.3378* -0.4146* 0.1652 0.2115 0.4960* -0.3308*
Duration of Enforcement (log) 0.2688* -0.4039* -0.4736* 0.0924 0.1504 0.4848* -0.2801*
Parking Tickets (log) 0.3468* -0.5779* -0.5102* 0.2856* 0.2396 0.5243* -0.2910*
Trust others -0.4512* 0.1933 0.3515* -0.3754* 0.073 -0.3699* 0.2798*
Membership 0.0099 -0.1929 -0.1658 0.1952 0.3418* 0.0549 -0.1683
Social Activism -0.4334* 0.1986 0.3786* -0.2016 -0.1077 -0.4702* 0.3011*
Justify Stolen Goods 0.0202 0.0033 -0.2266 0.1654 -0.1394 0.2617 0.1646
Justify Bribery -0.0188 0.0784 -0.0337 0.0197 -0.1994 0.1059 0.0897
 
 Democracy
No of Pro-
cedures 
(log) 
Duration of 
Enforce-
ment (log) 
Parking 
Tickets (log)
Trust oth-
ers 
Member-
ship 
Social 
Activism 
Democracy 1  
No of Procedures (log) -0.4434* 1  
Duration of Enforcement (log) -0.3744* 0.7564* 1  
Parking Tickets (log) -0.4930* 0.4353* 0.5475* 1  
Trust others 0.3674* -0.6252* -0.4742* -0.3763* 1 
Membership 0.0606 -0.3039* -0.3723* -0.1590 0.202 1
Social Activism 0.5992* -0.4561* -0.4645* -0.4188* 0.4642* 0.3281* 1
Justify Stolen Goods -0.2496 0.1888 0.2957* 0.3834* -0.3838* -0.0736 -0.2291
Justify Bribery -0.0986 0.2071 0.3504* 0.1200 -0.3809* -0.1044 -0.2392
 
 
Justify 
Stolen 
Goods 
Justify 
Bribery 
Justify Stolen Goods 1
Justify Bribery 0.6691* 1
 Table 5: Regression Results for Crime Incidence 
Beta coefficients are reported. t statistics in parenthesis. Errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 
 
 Car Theft (1) Other Theft (2) Burglary (3) Robbery (4) Assault (5) CRIME (6) 
Police Corruption (ICVS) 0.2063 (1.78)* 
0.0760 
(0.70) 
0.2319 
(2.39)** 
0.0394 
(0.31) 
0.2775 
(3.19)*** 
0.1917 
(2.34)** 
Crime Reporting -0.1973 (-1.28) 
-0.1882 
(-1.19) 
-0.1304 
(-1.18) 
-0.3600 
(-2.62)** 
-0.1597 
(-1.86)* 
-0.0945 
(-0.74) 
Gini Coefficient 0.2968 (1.71)* 
0.1114 
(0.79) 
0.2972 
(2.23)** 
0.3817 
(2.92)*** 
0.4892 
(3.76)*** 
0.3434 
(2.44)** 
Literacy Rate -0.5035 (-2.63)** 
-0.1922 
(-1.31) 
-0.5127 
(-3.26)*** 
-0.6660 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.5572 
(-3.81)*** 
-0.4963 
(-3.18)*** 
Urbanization Rate 0.5684 (2.78)*** 
0.2702 
(1.81)* 
0.2126 
(1.32) 
0.4968 
(3.37)*** 
0.2364 
(1.42) 
0.4032 
(2.70)*** 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.0351 (0.22) 
0.2924 
(1.78)* 
0.1372 
(1.41) 
0.0705 
(0.54) 
0.2257 
(2.06)** 
0.1785 
(1.42) 
Death penalty -0.1369 (-1.09) 
0.0289 
(0.20) 
-0.1473 
(-1.34) 
-0.2831 
(-2.72)*** 
-0.0774 
(-0.86) 
-0.1066 
(-0.96) 
Young population ( log) 0.4728 (2.30)** 
0.5156 
(3.03)*** 
0.4184 
(2.82)*** 
0.0274 
(0.18) 
0.0106 
(0.07) 
0.4276 
(2.68)*** 
Abortion Legal 0.1582 (1.11) 
0.0416 
(0.30) 
-0.0544 
(-0.46) 
-0.0481 
(-0.34) 
0.0345 
(0.32) 
0.0364 
(0.28) 
N 57 57 57 57 57 57 
Rsq. 0.6993 0.6258 0.6960 0.7259 0.7097 0.6921 
F-test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 6: Regression Results for Crime Reporting 
Beta coefficients are reported. t statistics in parenthesis. Errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 
 
 Car Theft (1) Other Theft (2) Burglary (3) Robbery (4) Assault (5) CRIME (6) 
Police Corruption (ICVS) -0.4521 (-3.25)*** 
-0.1452 
(-0.84) 
-0.4006 
(-2.02)** 
-0.1315 
(-1.48) 
-0.2518 
(-1.58) 
-0.3465 
(-2.21)** 
Crime Incidence -0.2895 (-2.81)*** 
-0.4568 
(-2.39)*** 
-0.0462 
(-0.32) 
-0.5599 
(-4.05)*** 
-0.2897 
(-1.84)* 
-0.3833 
(-3.09)*** 
Gini Coefficient -0.3442 (-2.28)** 
-0.2652 
(-1.72)* 
-0.2194 
(-1.17) 
-0.0081 
(-0.07) 
-0.0205 
(-0.11) 
-0.2301 
(-1.54) 
Literacy Rate -0.6103 (-3.16)*** 
-0.2130 
(-1.30) 
-0.2508 
(-1.41) 
-0.6231 
(-5.22)*** 
-0.2677 
(-1.45) 
-0.5220 
(-4.06)*** 
Urbanization Rate 0.5142 (3.73)*** 
0.3419 
(2.19)** 
0.4855 
(2.89)*** 
0.6567 
(4.32)*** 
0.3869 
(2.01)** 
0.5547 
(3.59)*** 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.2336 (1.65) 
0.1237 
(1.07) 
0.2249 
(1.63) 
0.0862 
(0.61) 
0.0412 
(0.09) 
0.1873 
(1.63) 
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Rsq. 0.5131 0.5258 0.3833 0.4276 0.2656 0.5499 
F-test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 7: Regression Results for Police Corruption 
Beta coefficients are reported. t statistics in parenthesis. Errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 
 
 Car Theft (1) Other Theft (2) Burglary (3) Robbery (4) Assault (5) CRIME (6) 
Crime Incidence -0.1725 (-1.00) 
-0.0761 
(-0.37) 
-0.0939 
(-0.64) 
0.2110 
(1.21) 
-0.3437 
(-1.49) 
-0.1915 
(-0.86) 
Crime Reporting -0.4536 (-2.93)*** 
-0.1223 
(-0.70) 
-0.3232 
(-3.01)*** 
-0.1075 
(-1.23) 
-0.1547 
(-1.54) 
-0.388 
(-3.19)*** 
Gini Coefficient 0.0213 (0.11) 
0.1510 
(0.90) 
0.1001 
(0.59) 
0.0224 
(0.12) 
0.3200 
(2.36)** 
0.0750 
(0.46) 
Literacy Rate -0.5123 (-2.94)*** 
-0.2508 
(-1.56) 
-0.3281 
(-2.16)** 
-0.1897 
(-1.13) 
-0.3129 
(-2.01**) 
-0.4073 
(-2.77)*** 
Urbanization Rate 0.3420 (2.71)*** 
0.1514 
(0.78) 
0.2732 
(1.71)* 
0.0627 
(0.10) 
0.2018 
(1.37) 
0.3122 
(2.18)** 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.3485 (2.05)** 
0.3702 
(1.57) 
0.3651 
(2.05)** 
0.3298 
(1.74)* 
0.4397 
(1.96)* 
0.3689 
(1.81)* 
Parking Tickets (log) 0.1365 (0.78) 
0.1325 
(0.79) 
0.1674 
(1.21) 
0.0936 
(0.59) 
0.0991 
(0.70) 
0.1379 
(0.82) 
N 54 54 54 54 54 54 
Rsq. 0.5144 0.4085 0.4799 0.4415 0.4608 0.4760 
F-test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0010 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 0.0001 
 
Table 8 – 2SLS Results 
t statistics in parenthesis. Errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 
percent. 
 
• Instruments for Crime: Existence of death penalty; Proportion of young population; Legality of abortion, 
Trust to other households (World Values Survey), Justify buying stolen goods (World Values Survey) 
• Instruments for Crime Reporting: Social activism, Membership to voluntary organizations (World Val-
ues Survey) 
• Instruments for Police Corruption: Number of parking tickets, Proportion of households who justify 
bribery (World Values Survey) 
 
 2SLS FIRST STAGE 
 Crime  Crime Rep. Pol. Corrup. Crime  Crime Rep. Pol. Corrup.
Crime Incidence  
-0.2906 
(-1.54) 
0.4151 
(1.40)    
Crime Reporting -0.4567 (-1.42)  
-0.2774 
(-2.13)**    
Police Corruption (ICVS) 0.1802 (0.80) 
-0.9167 
(-1.61)     
Gini Coefficient 0.0952 (0.47) 
-0.3633 
(-1.24) 
0.1632 
(0.93) 
0.2636 
(1.77)* 
-0.4584 
(-1.99)* 
0.1223 
(0.71) 
Literacy Rate -0.5382 (-1.55) 
-0.9701 
(-2.25)** 
-0.4852 
(-2.22)** 
-0.1171 
(-0.62) 
-1.1371 
(-3.88)*** 
-0.5153 
(2.34)** 
Urbanization Rate 0.5655 (3.35)*** 
0.8355 
(3.44)*** 
0.1853 
(0.95) 
0.5274 
(4.06)*** 
0.2858 
(1.43) 
0.3578 
(2.38)** 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.0257 (0.25) 
0.1680 
(0.90) 
-0.0054 
(-0.04) 
0.1260 
(1.32) 
-0.1557 
(-1.06) 
0.1146 
(1.04) 
Death penalty -0.2932 (-2.19)**   
-0.1331 
(-1.32) 
-0.3642 
(-2.35)** 
-0.1824 
(-1.57) 
Young population (0-15, log) -0.1704 (-0.63)   
0.5391 
(4.43)*** 
-0.7811 
(-4.15)*** 
0.3003 
(2.13)** 
Abortion Legal 0.2794 (1.93)*   
0.1458 
(1.12) 
0.2288 
(1.14) 
-0.3170 
(-2.11)** 
Trust 0.0431 (0.40)   
0.0179 
(0.13) 
0.1377 
(0.67) 
0.1052 
(0.68) 
Justify Buying Stolen Goods 0.1399 (1.73)*   
0.1095 
(1.21) 
0.2377 
(1.70) 
0.0373 
(0.36) 
Social Activism  
0.2274 
(1.07)  
0.0227 
(0.23) 
-0.1555 
(-0.34) 
0.2509 
(2.84)*** 
Membership in voluntary organi-
zations  
-0.1597 
(-0.65)  
-0.0368 
(-0.31) 
-0.0624 
(-1.04) 
-0.3900 
(-2.24)** 
Parking Tickets (log)   
-0.1081 
(-0.73) 
0.2270 
(2.15)** 
-0.2593 
(-1.62) 
0.0581 
(0.48) 
Justify Bribery   
-0.0355 
(-0.38) 
-0.1414 
(-1.32) 
-0.0481 
(-0.25) 
-0.0661 
(-0.53) 
Rsq. 0.8068 0.6273 0.6487 0.6913 0.7166 0.6321 
F-Test 0.0006 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 
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Table 9 – 3SLS Results 
t statistics in parenthesis. Errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 
percent. 
 
• Instruments for Crime: Existence of death penalty; Proportion of young population; Legality of abortion, 
Trust to other households (World Values Survey), Justify buying stolen goods (World Values Survey) 
• Instruments for Crime Reporting: Social activism, Membership to voluntary organizations (World Val-
ues Survey) 
• Instruments for Police Corruption: Number of parking tickets, Proportion of households who justify 
bribery (World Values Survey) 
 
 Crime Inci-dence 
Crime Re-
porting 
Police Cor-
ruption 
Crime Incidence  
-0.4523 
(-2.17)** 
0.1927 
(0.80) 
Crime Reporting -0.6011 (-2.43)**  
-0.4013 
(-3.31)*** 
Police Corruption (ICVS) -0.2531 (-1.56) 
-1.3500 
(-3.03)***  
Gini Coefficient -0.0295 (-0.19) 
-0.2058 
(-0.85) 
0.0188 
(0.13) 
Literacy Rate -0.5990 (-2.22)** 
-1.1113 
(-3.16)*** 
-0.6190 
(-3.36)*** 
Urbanization Rate 0.5874 (4.42)*** 
0.8673 
(4.30)*** 
0.3866 
(2.45)** 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.2691 (1.91)* 
0.1696 
(1.56) 
0.2488 
(2.16)** 
Death penalty -0.2734 (-2.67)***   
Young population (0-15, log) 0.0538 (0.26)   
Abortion Legal 0.3750 (3.70)***   
Trust 0.0476 (0.59)   
Justify Buying Stolen Goods 0.1550 (2.54)**   
Social Activism  
0.2292 
(1.45)  
Membership in voluntary organi-
zations  
0.1168 
(0.62)  
Parking Tickets (log)   
-0.0228 
(-0.21) 
Justify Bribery   
-0.0732 
(-1.07) 
Rsq. 0.7533 0.5435 0.6049 
F-Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 38 38 38 
 
  
